1. Field of the Invention
The present invention relates to key agreement protocols for transfer and authentication of encryption keys.
2. Discussion of Related Art
To retain privacy during the exchange of information it is well known to encrypt data using a key. The key must be chosen so that the correspondents are able to encrypt and decrypt messages but such that an interceptor cannot determine the contents of the message.
In a secret key cryptographic protocol, the correspondents share a common key that is secret to them. This requires the key to be agreed upon between the correspondents and for provision to be made to maintain the secrecy of the key and provide for change of the key should the underlying security be compromised.
Public key cryptographic protocols were first proposed in 1976 by Diffie-Hellman and utilized a public key made available to all potential correspondents and a private key known only to the intended recipient. The public and private keys are related such that a message encrypted with the public key of a recipient can be readily decrypted with the private key but the private key cannot be derived from the knowledge of the plaintext, ciphertext and public-key.
Key establishment is the process by which two (or more) parties establish a shared secret key, called the session key. The session key is subsequently used to achieve some cryptographic goal, such as privacy. There are two kinds of key agreement protocol; key transport protocols in which a key is created by one party and securely transmitted to the second party; and key agreement protocols, in which both parties contribute information which jointly establish the shared secret key. The number of message exchanges required between the parties is called the number of passes. A key establishment protocol is said to provide implicit key authentication (or simply key authentication) if one party is assured that no other party aside from a specially identified second party may learn the value of the session key. The property of implicit key authentication does not necessarily mean that the second party actually possesses the session key. A key establishment protocol is said to provide key confirmation if one party is assured that a specially identified second party actually has possession of a particular session key. If the authentication is provided to both parties involved in the protocol, then the key authentication is said to be mutual; if provided to only one party, the authentication is said to be unilateral.
There are various prior proposals which claim to provide implicit key authentication.
Examples include the Nyberg-Ruappel one-pass protocol and the Matsumoto-Takashima-Imai (MTI) and the Goss and Yacobi two-pass protocols for key agreement.
The prior proposals ensure that transmissions between correspondents to establish a common key are secure and that an interloper cannot retrieve the session key and decrypt the ciphertext. In this way security for sensitive transactions such as transfer of funds is provided.
For example the MTI/A0 key agreement protocol establishes a shared secret K, known to the two correspondents, in the following manner:
1. During initial, one-time setup, key generation and publication is undertaken by selecting and publishing an appropriate system prime p and generator .alpha..epsilon.Z.sub.p * in a manner guaranteeing authenticity. Correspondent A selects as a long-term private key a random integer "a",1&lt;a&lt;p-1, and computes a long-term public key z.sub.A =.alpha..sup.a mod p. B generates analogous keys b, z.sub.B. A and B have access to authenticated copies of each other's long-term public key. PA1 2. The protocol requires the exchange of the following messages EQU A.fwdarw.B: .alpha..sup.x mod p (1) EQU A.rarw.B: .alpha..sup.y mod p (2) PA1 3. To implement the protocol the following steps are performed each time a shared key is required. PA1 i) a first of said correspondents A selecting a first random integer x and exponentiating a function f(.alpha.) including said generator to a power g(x) to provide a first exponentiated function f(.alpha.).sup.g(x) ; PA1 ii) said first correspondent A generating a first signature s.sub.A from said random integer x and said first exponentiated function f(.alpha.).sup.g(x) ; PA1 iii) said first correspondent A forwarding to a second correspondent B a message including said first exponentiated function f(.alpha.).sup.g(x) ; PA1 iv) said correspondent B selecting a second random integer y and exponentiating a function f'(.alpha.) including said generator to a power g(y) to provide a second exponentiated function f'(.alpha.).sup.g(y) and generating a signature s.sub.B obtained from said second integer y and said second exponentiated function f'(.alpha.).sup.g(y) ; PA1 v) said second correspondent B forwarding a message to said first correspondent A including said second exponentiated function f'(.alpha.).sup.g(y) PA1 vi) each of said correspondents A and B constructing a session key K by exponentiating information made public by said other correspondent with said random integer that is private to themselves.
The values of x and y remain secure during such transmissions as it is impractical to determine the exponent even when the value of .alpha. and the exponentiation is known provided of course that p is chosen sufficiently large.
(a) A chooses a random integer x,1.ltoreq.x.ltoreq.p-2, and sends B message (1) i.e. .alpha..sup.x mod p. PA2 (b) B chooses a random integer y,1.ltoreq.y.ltoreq.p-2, and sends A message (2) i.e. .alpha..sup.y mod p. PA2 (c) A computes the key K=(.alpha..sup.y).sup.a z.sub.B.sup.x mod p. PA2 (d) B computes the key K=(.alpha..sup.x).sup.b z.sub.A.sup.y mod p. PA2 (e) Both share the key K-.alpha..sup.bx+ay.
In order to compute the key K, A must use his secret key a and the random integer X, both of which are known only to him. Similarly B must use her secret key b and random integer y to compute the session key K. Provided the secret keys a,b remain uncompromised, an interloper cannot generate a session key identical to the other correspondent. Accordingly, any ciphertext will not be decipherable by both correspondents.
As such this and related protocols have been considered satisfactory for key establishment and resistant to conventional eavesdropping or man-in-the-middle attacks.
In some circumstances it may be advantageous for an adversary to mislead one correspondent as to the true identity of the other correspondent.
In such an attack an active adversary or interloper E modifies messages exchanged between A and B, with the result that B believes that he shares a key K with E while A believes that she shares the same key K with B. Even though E does not learn the value of K the misinformation as to the identity of the correspondents may be useful.
A practical scenario where such an attack may be launched successfully is the following. Suppose that B is a bank branch and A is an account holder. Certificates are issued by the bank headquarters and within the certificate is the account information of the holder. Suppose that the protocol for electronic deposit of funds is to exchange a key with a bank branch via a mutually authenticated key agreement. Once B has authenticated the transmitting entity, encrypted funds are deposited to the account number in the certificate. If no further authentication is done in the encrypted deposit message (which might be the case to save bandwidth) then the deposit will be made to E's account.